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BLOCKING THE FLOW: TEXAS FACES NEW 
CHALLENGES IN ITS WATER CRISIS AFTER 
AN UNFAVORABLE RULING IN TARRANT 
Amal Bala* 
Abstract: As Texas’s population continues growing, the state is struggling 
to forestall a looming water crisis. Tarrant Regional Water District, a Texas 
state agency, sought to purchase some of Oklahoma’s water from the Red 
River, which forms a boundary between the states. Tarrant’s efforts failed 
because Oklahoma’s water permit laws disfavor out-of-state purchasers. 
Tarrant sued the Oklahoma Water Resources Board and claimed in part 
that Oklahoma’s laws create an unconstitutional restriction on interstate 
commerce. In Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and dismissed 
Tarrant’s Commerce Clause claim as meritless. This Comment argues that 
the Supreme Court’s holding could hinder interstate cooperation in solv-
ing water shortages. 
Introduction 
 As populations grow in cities and towns across the United States, 
state governments are scrambling for solutions to their current and 
projected shortages of fresh water.1 The effects of global warming also 
pose a threat to water supplies through rising sea levels, loss of land, 
and a disruption of the balance between fresh water and salt water.2 
Furthermore, scientists expect global climate change to put seventy 
percent of the approximately 3100 counties in the United States at risk 
of water shortages by the middle of this century.3 State governments are 
attempting to combat water scarcity before the problem worsens 
through conservation, planning, water transportation, and defining 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 See Cynthia Gordy, Water Shortage: 6 Things to Know, Root (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www. 
theroot.com/views/america-s-water-shortage; Water Supply in the U.S., EPA, http://www.epa. 
gov/WaterSense/pubs/supply.html (last visited May 7, 2013). 
2 A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law, Global Warming, and Growth Limitations, 24 Loy. 
L.A. L. Rev. 979, 979 (1991). 
3 U.S. Water Shortages Loom, Homeland Sec. News Wire (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www. 
homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120224-u-s-water-shortages-loom. 
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water rights.4 Texas, the second most populous state in the nation,5 fac-
es a looming water crisis and is struggling to ensure that its booming 
population has access to fresh water in coming years.6 
 As a natural resource, water does not remain inside national or 
state boundaries permanently but instead travels through the Earth’s 
hydrologic cycle by changing location and physical form as a solid, liq-
uid, and gas.7 Earth’s hydrologic cycle functions independently of po-
litical considerations,8 but humans create rules of natural resources al-
location that have a potential to give one geopolitical group greater 
access than another.9 In the United States, these rules often appear as 
state regulations of water appropriation.10 
 Texas, with a population of more than twenty-five million in 2010, 
grew at a rate of 20.6% from 2000 to 2010, which was more than twice 
the 9.7% national growth rate.11 In particular, the Dallas-Fort Worth ar-
ea recently ranked fourth in the nation by total population.12 In re-
sponse to an increasing need for water in this area, Texas attempted to 
import water belonging to Oklahoma from the Red River, a major 
source of water shared by the states.13 Oklahoma’s water permit laws dis-
                                                                                                                      
4 E.g., Tarlock, supra note 2, at 982–83; Water Information, Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies, 
http://www.acwa.com/content/water-information (last visited May 7, 2013) (discussing Cali-
fornia’s response to its dwindling water supply). 
5 Paul Mackun et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Population Distribution and Change: 
2000 to 2010, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010 
br-01.pdf. 
6 Tex. Water Dev. Bd., Water For Texas 2012 State Water Plan, at III (2012), 
available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/state_water_plan/2012/00.pdf. 
7 See Richard S. Harnsberger et al., Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options After Spor-
hase, 70 Neb. L. Rev. 754, 777–78 (1991). 
8 See Joseph A. Kishiyama, Note, The Prophecy of Poor Dick: The Nebraska Supreme Court 
Recognizes a Surface Water Appropriator’s Claim Against a Hydrologically Connected Ground Water 
User in Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 284, 290 (2006) (discussing Earth’s 
hydrologic cycle as a “continuous movement of water from the oceans to the atmosphere 
and back to the sea”). 
9 See Montgomery F. Simus & James G. Workman, The Water Ethic: The Inexorable Birth of 
a Certain Alienable Right, 23 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 439, 442 (2010). 
10 See Harnsberger, supra note 7, at 758. 
11 State & County QuickFacts: Texas, U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
qfd/states/48000.html (last updated Mar. 14, 2013); see Ross Ramsey et al., Minorities Drove 
Texas Growth, Census Figures Show, Tex. Trib., Feb. 18, 2011, http://www.texastribune.org/ 
texas-counties-and-demographics/census/minorities-drove-texas-growth-census-figures-show. 
12 Lance Murray, Dallas-Fort Worth’s Population Ranks 4th Nationally, Dallas Bus. J. ( Jan. 
18, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/blog/2012/01/dallas-fort-worths-
population-ranks.html. 
13 Wes Strickland, Back to the Whiteboard, Am. Water Intelligence, Oct. 2011, available 
at http://www.americanwaterintel.com/archive/2/10/analysis/back-whiteboard.html. 
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favor out-of-state purchasers, however, and blocked Texas’s efforts.14 
These water allocation issues were at the heart of Tarrant Regional Water 
District v. Herrmann, in which the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of Oklahoma’s permit laws.15 This Comment argues that Con-
gress did not consent to Oklahoma’s water permit laws despite sanction-
ing an interstate agreement known as the Red River Compact.16 This 
Comment also argues that the Court’s holding could increase water 
scarcity and hinder cooperation between states because it encourages 
economic isolation.17 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 The Red River is a large channel of water separating southeastern 
Oklahoma from northeastern Texas.18 In 1955, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, and Texas received permission from Congress to negotiate 
a pact apportioning water in the Red River Basin.19 Each state signed 
the agreement, known as the Red River Compact (the “Compact”), in 
1978, and Congress ratified it in 1980.20 As part of the Compact, each 
state can control the allocation of its share of water with a common 
goal of resolving disputes and avoiding litigation.21 
 Tarrant Regional Water District (“Tarrant”) is a Texas state agency 
that tried to satisfy an increasing demand for water in north central 
Texas by attempting to purchase portions of Oklahoma’s Red River wa-
ter subject to the Compact.22 Oklahoma, which requires purchasers to 
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. 
15 See Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No. 11–889, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jun. 13, 
2013). 
16 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992) (noting that Congress must ex-
press an “unambiguous intent” to allow state violations of the Commerce Clause); Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) (noting that Congress’s intentions must be “unmistakably clear” if it 
intends to alter the balance of power between the federal government and the states). 
17 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1977) (discussing the prob-
lematic cumulative effect of protectionist state laws that discriminate against interstate 
commerce in trash disposal). 
18 Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (Tarrant III), 656 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
19 Red River Compact Commission, Okla. Water Resources Board, http://www.owrb.ok. 
gov/rrccommission/rrccommission.html (last visited May 7, 2013). 
20 Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1228 (citing Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980)). 
21 Red River Compact Commission, supra note 19. 
22 Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (Tarrant I ), No. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 
3922803, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Tarrant III, 656 F.3d 
1222 (No. 11–889); see Joe Patranella, Note, Love Thy Neighbor As Thyself: An Analysis of the 
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obtain permits to appropriate water from within its borders, created the 
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (“OWRB”) to process applications.23 
The Oklahoma Legislature created criteria to guide OWRB permitting 
decisions, including a requirement that out-of-state applications be 
treated less favorably than in-state applications.24 Tarrant applied to the 
OWRB for permits to take water from Beaver Creek, Cache Creek, and 
the Kiamichi River, all Oklahoma tributaries of the Red River.25 
 This dispute involves four stages of litigation.26 In Tarrant I, filed 
on November 1, 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Oklahoma, Tarrant sought an injunction and a declaratory judg-
ment that the statutes controlling the OWRB’s application process were 
unconstitutional.27 In 2009, while litigation was pending, the Oklahoma 
Legislature modified the application process but still commanded the 
OWRB to disfavor out-of-state purchasers.28 Tarrant revised its com-
plaint to challenge the amended statutes.29 On November 18, 2009, the 
district court granted summary judgment to the OWRB.30 
 In Tarrant II, Tarrant returned to court and resurrected its earlier 
arguments against the statutes as applied to two alternative deals with 
Oklahoma entities for water not subject to the Compact.31 One agree-
ment was with owners of groundwater rights in Stephens County, and 
the other was a memorandum of understanding with the Apache Tribe 
where the parties agreed to work together to ascertain the tribe’s water 
                                                                                                                      
Texas Water Shortage, Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, and Why Oklahoma 
Should Be Mandated to Allow Texas to Purchase Water, 52 S. Tex. L. Rev. 297, 299 (2010). 
23 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 105.9 (West 2013); Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1228. 
24 See Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1228. 
25 Id.; Tarrant I, 2009 WL 3922803, at *1. 
26 Tarrant, slip op. at 7–9; Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1227; Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. 
Herrmann (Tarrant II ), No. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2010 WL 2817220, at *1, *2 (W.D. Okla. 
2010); Tarrant I, 2009 WL 3922803, at *1. 
27 Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1228; Complaint at 1, Tarrant I, 2009 WL 3922803 (No. CIV-
07-00045-HE). 
28 Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1230. The new criteria included requiring the OWRB to con-
sider whether the water that the applicant desired could be used in Oklahoma instead of 
out-of-state. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 105.12(A)(5) (West 2013). Another new restriction 
on the OWRB prohibits it from granting a permit if doing so would impair Oklahoma’s 
ability “to meet its obligations under any interstate stream compact.” Id. § 105.12A(B)(1). 
29 Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1230; Amended Complaint at 9–10, Tarrant II, 2010 WL 
2817220 (No. CIV-07-0045-HE). 
30 Tarrant I, 2009 WL 3922803, at *8. 
31 Tarrant II, 2010 WL 2817220, at *1. 
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rights.32 On July 16, 2010, the district court ruled that neither of these 
new agreements created a justiciable controversy.33 
 Tarrant appealed the district court’s decisions from Tarrant I and 
Tarrant II to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.34 In reviewing 
the entire litigation up to that point, the Tenth Circuit considered 
whether the Compact preempted the Oklahoma statutes, the justiciabil-
ity of Tarrant’s claim based on the two new agreements, and whether 
the Oklahoma water permit statutes violate the Commerce Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.35 The Tenth Circuit found in favor of the OWRB, 
and Tarrant appealed to the Supreme Court.36 On June 13, 2013, the 
Supreme Court affirmed unanimously and held that the Compact did 
not preempt Oklahoma’s water permit laws and that the laws do not 
violate the Commerce Clause.37 
II. Legal Background 
 The Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution grants Congress 
power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”38 Con-
gress’s power to regulate interstate commerce has no limit other than 
the words of the Constitution.39 Congress can regulate the channels of 
interstate commerce, common instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, and activities having a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce.40 Water is an article of commerce susceptible to regulation un-
der the Commerce Clause.41 
 The Supreme Court interprets the Commerce Clause as an exclu-
sive grant of power to Congress that implicitly restricts state regulation 
                                                                                                                      
32 Id. Tarrant and the Apache Tribe agreed to determine the tribe’s water rights so 
that Tarrant could purchase water from the tribe to meet the needs of Texas residents. Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1227–28. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 1250; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tarrant III, supra note 22, at 2. 
37 Tarrant, slip op. at 24. 
38 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
39 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824). 
40 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (citing 
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)) (channels of interstate commerce); 
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (substantial relation to 
interstate commerce); Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914) 
(common instrumentalities of interstate commerce). 
41 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982) (noting that “water 
is an article of commerce”). 
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of interstate commerce.42 Under this interpretation, known as the 
dormant Commerce Clause, state laws are unconstitutional if they im-
pede interstate commerce because Congress has exclusive regulatory 
power on this subject.43 The policy behind this doctrine is to prevent 
states from attempting to protect their economic interests through laws 
that burden other states.44 In 1978, in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
the Supreme Court held that protectionist state laws burden interstate 
commerce and violate the Commerce Clause, absent a strong showing 
of legitimate public benefit.45 Without this restriction on state laws, 
states might exacerbate their shared economic problems through ever-
increasing attempts at isolation and retaliation.46 This danger led the 
Court to declare in City of Philadelphia that a New Jersey law that prohib-
ited trash from outside the state was unconstitutional.47 
 Based on these policy concerns, courts interpret the Commerce 
Clause in a manner that preserves the vertical federalist structure of 
government that the Constitution carefully establishes.48 The dormant 
Commerce Clause also allows courts to preserve the Constitution’s plan 
of horizontal unity among the states by preventing them from engaging 
in retaliatory economic activity.49 Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, writing 
                                                                                                                      
42 Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008). The Supreme Court has 
“sensed a negative implication” in the Commerce Clause that Congress’s exclusive power to 
regulate interstate commerce restricts states from engaging in such regulation. Id. 
43 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 401–02 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). A state law violates the Constitution if it “discriminates against 
interstate commerce on its face or in practical effect.” Id. 
44 Davis, 553 U.S. at 337–38; see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 
U.S. 175, 180 (1995) (noting the dormant Commerce Clause prevents states “from retreat-
ing into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole”); Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923) (noting the purpose of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is “to protect commercial intercourse from invidious restraints, to pre-
vent interference through conflicting or hostile state laws and to insure uniformity in regu-
lation”), aff’d Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 263 U.S. 350 (1923). 
45 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978). 
46 See id. at 629. 
47 Id. 
48 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (not-
ing that courts have a role in preserving the Constitution’s federalist structure). The Con-
stitution establishes a vertical federalist structure by granting certain powers to the federal 
government and reserving all other powers to the states or the people. See U.S. Const. art. 
VI (declaring that the U.S. Constitution and federal law are “the supreme Law of the 
Land”); U.S. Const. amend. X (reserving powers not granted to the federal government 
to the states or the people); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat) 316, 405 (1819) 
(noting that the federal government is “one of enumerated powers”). 
49 See Daniel M. Forman, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Massachusetts 
Landfill Moratorium: Are National Market Principles Adequately Served?, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. 
Rev. 425, 430–31 (1997) (discussing the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause as pro-
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about state protectionism for the Court in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 
explained that the Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the 
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the 
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”50 
 States can avoid the restrictions of the dormant Commerce Clause 
if Congress consents to protectionist state laws.51 Because congressional 
consent can obviate the unconstitutionality of state protectionism, 
courts considering a dormant Commerce Clause challenge must ask 
first whether Congress consented to the state law.52 The standard for 
consent includes express statements and any other statements that in-
dicate congressional deliberation and intent.53 
 In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that if Congress’s 
purpose is to permit a protectionist state law—changing the default 
constitutional balance between the states and the federal govern-
ment—Congress must make its intent “unmistakably clear” through 
statutory language.54 The Court has held that “Congress must manifest 
its unambiguous intent before a federal statute will be read to permit or 
to approve” violations of the Commerce Clause.55 The policy behind 
requiring clear congressional consent is to ensure that the national leg-
islature truly acted collectively, thus minimizing the risk that restraints 
on commerce will harm unrepresented interests.56 
 In contexts where the Court’s jurisprudence requires clear state-
ments from Congress that demonstrate congressional consent, the 
                                                                                                                      
tecting national economic development and ensuring “the integrity of the national politi-
cal union”). The Constitution’s plan of horizontal unity involves investing Congress with 
the power to regulate interstate commerce, which will curtail retaliation among the states 
and preserve national unity. See id. 
50 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). The lack of federal commerce power under the Articles of 
Confederation was a major problem creating the need for the Constitution in the first 
place. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005); see The Federalist Nos. 6, 22 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
51 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). 
52 See S.–Cent. Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91–92 (1984) (discussing 
how the policy behind the dormant Commerce Clause requires courts to find an “unmis-
takably clear” manifestation of congressional consent to state protectionism). 
53 See, e.g., Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91–92 (congressional intent can come in multiple 
ways but “must be unmistakably clear”); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427, 
430–31 (1946) (congressional consent is evident when the intent to consent is “expressly 
stated”). 
54 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 
65 (1989)). 
55 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 
131, 139 (1986)); Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91. 
56 Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 92. 
20 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:F. Supp. 
Court disfavors consulting legislative history.57 In 1989, in Dellmuth v. 
Muth, the Supreme Court considered whether a federal statute abro-
gated Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity from lawsuits under the Elev-
enth Amendment.58 The Court found that Congress’s alleged intent to 
abrogate sovereign immunity was not “unmistakably clear” in the stat-
ute, and that consulting legislative history was irrelevant because con-
gressional intent requires a clear statement within the statutory text.59 
The Court in Dellmuth reasoned that if Congress’s intent is unmistaka-
bly clear in the statutory text, legislative history is unnecessary, and if 
Congress’s intent is not unmistakably clear, consulting legislative his-
tory merely confirms that the standard remains unmet.60 When consid-
ering challenges to state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause, 
courts treat federal statutes and congressionally approved interstate 
compacts equally.61 
 The standard for Congress’s intent to consent to state protection-
ism remains high.62 Even broad language that signifies extreme defer-
ence to state laws can fail to indicate consent.63 For example, in 1982, 
in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas the Supreme Court held that a 
Nebraska groundwater statute’s reciprocity requirement for out-of-state 
purchasers violated the dormant Commerce Clause despite the pres-
ence of extremely deferential language in a federal statute.64 Nebraska 
relied on the Reclamation Act of 1902, which stated that “nothing in 
this Act shall be construed as affecting . . . the laws of any State or Terri-
tory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water 
used in irrigation.”65 The Court found that this language fell short of 
                                                                                                                      
57 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (discouraging the use of legislative his-
tory within the context of congressional consent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity); see also C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (rea-
soning that “isolated references [in legislative history] do not satisfy our requirement of an 
explicit statutory authorization” from Congress in the dormant Commerce Clause con-
text); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 342 (1982) (noting that 
within the dormant Commerce Clause context, relying on “isolated fragments of legislative 
history in divining the intent of Congress is an exercise fraught with hazards”). 
58 Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 226–27. 
59 Id. at 230. 
60 Id. 
61 See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 
U.S. 554, 564 (1983)). 
62 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 65). Congress must make its 
intent to consent to state protectionism “unmistakably clear.” Id. 
63 See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959–60. 
64 See id. at 958–60. 
65 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2006); Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959. 
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an unmistakably clear expression of congressional consent to state pro-
tectionism.66 
 In cases where Congress’s intent to consent to state protectionist 
laws is clear from the federal statute itself, the Court has found that 
such state laws do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.67 For ex-
ample, in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System the Court upheld state laws passed by Massachusetts and Con-
necticut that allowed bank holding companies within New England to 
acquire banks located in those two states, even though the laws did not 
extend this ability to similar companies outside of New England.68 The 
Court held that the text of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as 
revised by an amendment, clearly demonstrated Congress’s intent to 
allow protectionist state laws pursuant to the purpose of the statute.69 
The clear showing of consent in the statutory text protected the laws 
from challenges under the dormant Commerce Clause.70 
 Consent from Congress is not the only way that a state can create 
laws that do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.71 The courts 
can still uphold a protectionist state law that lacks congressional ap-
proval if the state law’s effects on interstate commerce are merely inci-
dental and the burden on interstate commerce is not excessive relative 
to the state benefits.72 
                                                                                                                      
66 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959–60; see also New Eng. Power, 455 U.S. at 341 (determining 
that seemingly deferential language in the Federal Power Act did not grant to New Hamp-
shire authority to create protectionist state law on export of hydroelectric power). 
67 See, e.g., Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 
174, 178 (1985) (stating that the Bank Holding Company Act’s text showed Congress’s 
intent to consent to protectionist state laws); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 
130, 155 (1982) (discussing how the Indian Reorganization Act’s text showed Congress’s 
intent to consent to protectionist Native American tribal taxes). 
68 472 U.S. at 164, 178. 
69 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982); Ne. Bancorp, 472 
U.S. at 174–75 (citing W. & So. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653–
54 (1981). The Act stated that “no application . . . shall be approved under this section 
which will permit any bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly 
or indirectly, any . . . interest in . . . any additional bank located outside [the company’s 
state of operations],” but then allowed such a scenario to occur only if “the acquisition of 
such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-State bank holding company is specifically 
authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by language to 
that effect and not merely by implication.” 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d). 
70 Ne. Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 174–75 (citing W. & So. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 451 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1981)). 
71 See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970)). The Court takes “a much more flexible approach” to state laws that promote 
local interests while having only incidental effects on interstate commerce. Id. 
72 See id. 
22 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:F. Supp. 
III. Analysis 
 The Supreme Court held unanimously in Tarrant Regional Water 
District v. Herrmann that the Red River Compact (the “Compact”) does 
not preempt Oklahoma’s water permit statutes.73 The Court held that 
the Red River water that Tarrant sought to appropriate properly re-
mains under Oklahoma’s control through the Compact’s terms, and 
therefore preemption is nonexistent.74 The Court also unanimously 
denied Tarrant’s dormant Commerce Clause argument by framing 
Tarrant’s claim as pertaining to unallocated water only.75 The Court 
then concluded that because the Compact does not leave any Red River 
water unallocated, Tarrant’s claim is therefore meritless.76    
 The Court’s holding pertaining to the dormant Commerce Clause 
deserves careful analysis because the Compact’s language does not sat-
isfy the standard for Congress’s consent to state protectionism.77 The 
Court also did not determine whether Oklahoma’s laws might dis-
criminate against interstate Commerce but only with marginal effects, 
which could make the laws permissible under the Court’s precedent.78 
The Court’s focus on unallocated water allowed the Court to avoid the 
deeper issues in this case, namely the possibility of impermissible re-
strictions on interstate commerce.79 Finally, the Court’s holding could 
hinder interstate cooperation in solving water shortages in the future.80 
 Examining the Court’s holding in light of its own precedent reveals 
that the Compact’s language fails to satisfy the “unmistakably clear” and 
“unambiguous” standard for Congress’s consent to protectionist state 
laws that discriminate against interstate commerce.81 In Sporhase v. Ne-
                                                                                                                      
73 Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No. 11–889, slip op. at 24 (U.S. Jun. 13, 
2013). 
74 Id. at 22. 
75 Id. at 23–24. 
76 Id. 
77 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 
131, 139 (1986)); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (quoting Will v. Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)); S.-Cent. Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 
U.S. 82, 91 (1984)). 
78 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1977) (citing Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). The Court takes a “flexible approach” to state stat-
utes that promote local interests while creating effects on interstate commerce that are mere-
ly incidental. Id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 629 (discussing the cumulative effect of protectionist state laws that dis-
criminate against interstate commerce in garbage disposal). 
81 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 458 (citing Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139); Gregory, 501 
U.S. at 460–61 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 65); S.-Cent. Timber Dev. Inc., 467 U.S. at 91. The 
Compact includes deferential language that is open to interpretation. See, e.g., Red River 
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braska ex rel. Douglas, language similar to the Compact language was 
insufficient to prove consent.82 In Sporhase, the Court held that language 
in the Reclamation Act of 1902— “nothing in this Act shall be construed 
as affecting . . . the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, 
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation” —did not 
support Nebraska’s argument that Congress consented to its protection-
ist water laws.83 Nothing in the Act’s language indicated Congress’s in-
tent to legislate away its Commerce Clause power.84 
 The language in the Red River Compact is remarkably similar to 
the language in the Reclamation Act of 1902 and does not demonstrate 
that Congress intended to consent to state protectionism when agree-
ing to allow Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana to enter into an 
agreement to define each state’s water rights.85 In fact, language in the 
Compact suggests the exact opposite, namely that Congress contem-
plated preserving its Commerce Clause power over Red River water as 
an article of interstate commerce: “Nothing in this Compact shall be 
deemed to impair or affect the powers, rights, or obligations of the 
United States, or those claiming under its authority, in, over and to wa-
ter of the Red River Basin.”86 This language suggests that Congress in-
tended not to disturb its Commerce Clause authority over Red River 
water, which is an article of commerce.87 
 Because the standard for congressional intent to consent to state 
protectionism is high, the Supreme Court could have distinguished this 
case from Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
                                                                                                                      
Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 § 2.01 (1980). Examples includes “unrestricted 
use” (§ 4.02(b)), “[e]ach Signatory State may use the water allocated to it by this Compact 
in any manner deemed beneficial by that state” (§ 2.01), “[e]ach state may freely adminis-
ter water rights and uses in accordance with the laws of that state” (§ 2.01), and “[n]othing 
in this Compact shall be deemed to . . . [i]nterfere with or impair the right or power of any 
Signatory State to regulate within its boundaries the appropriation, use, and control of 
water.” (§ 2.10(a)). 
82 See 458 U.S. 941, 959 (1982). 
83 Id. at 959 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 383). 
84 Id. at 959–60. 
85 Compare Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2006) (“Nothing in this Act shall 
be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of 
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water 
used in irrigation . . . .”), with Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 
§ 2.10(a) (Nothing in this Compact shall be deemed to: Interfere with or impair the right 
or power of any Signatory State to regulate within its boundaries the appropriation, use, 
and control of water, or quality of water.”); see Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959–60. 
86 See Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 § 2.07. 
87 See id.; Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954 (noting that water is an article of commerce for 
purposes of Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
24 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:F. Supp. 
System.88 In Northeast Bancorp, the Court found unmistakably clear proof 
of Congress’s intent in the text of the Bank Holding Company Act.89 
The statutory text showed that Congress contemplated the types of pro-
tectionist state laws that Massachusetts and Connecticut enacted, which 
favored New England bank holding companies over outside compa-
nies.90 In Tarrant, however, the deferential Compact language does not 
demonstrate an unmistakably clear congressional intent to consent to 
protectionism because some of the key provisions are ambiguous.91 For 
example, the language in section 4.02(b) instructs that Oklahoma shall 
have “free and unrestricted use” of portions of the Red River water,92 
but this does not sufficiently demonstrate that Congress intended to 
allow Oklahoma to create protectionist laws.93 
 Congress’s supposed intent to consent to protectionism in Tarrant 
is not unmistakably clear or unambiguous because ambiguity remains.94 
As Tarrant argued in its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that certain language 
in the Compact “might suggest no more than preservation of existing 
state laws without protecting them from dormant Commerce Clause 
attack.”95 This suggestion that at least a portion of the Compact is sus-
                                                                                                                      
88 See 472 U.S. 159, 174–75 (1985) (holding that statutory text of the Bank Holding 
Company Act satisfied the standard for congressional intent to consent to state protection-
ist laws); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 65) (holding that if Con-
gress intends to alter the structure of power between the federal government and the 
states, it must make its intent “unmistakably clear”). 
89 472 U.S. at 174–75. 
90 Id.; see Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982) (stating that 
“no application . . . shall be approved under this section which will permit any bank hold-
ing company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any . . . interest in 
. . . any additional bank located outside [the company’s state of operations], unless the 
acquisition of such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-State bank holding com-
pany is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, 
by language to that effect and not merely by implication”). 
91 See Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 §§ 2.01, 2.10(a), 4.02(b) 
(1980). 
92 See id. § 4.02(b). 
93 See id. § 2.07. Other portions of the Compact suggest that Congress intended to re-
tain its Commerce Clause power. See id. 
94 See New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341 (1982) (stating that 
Congress’s deference to state laws in federal legislation can merely “leave standing what-
ever valid state laws then existed”); Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 
§ 2.10(a). 
95 Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (Tarrant III), 656 F.3d 1222, 1238 (10th Cir. 
2011); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tarrant III, supra note 22, at 21. 
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ceptible to multiple interpretations indicates that the unmistakably 
clear standard for Congress’s intent might remain unmet.96 
 The Supreme Court also did not address the Tenth Circuit’s use of 
legislative history—the Compact’s Interpretive Comments—to discern 
Congress’s intentions when it approved the Compact.97 Consulting 
such comments seems unnecessary if congressional consent to state 
protectionism was unmistakably clear in the Compact language itself.98 
In Dellmuth v. Muth, the Supreme Court discouraged reliance on legisla-
tive history when examining Congress’s supposed intent to consent to 
abrogation of Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment.99 Tarrant is similar to Dellmuth because this case also re-
quires a clear statement from Congress to demonstrate consent, and 
reliance on material beyond the Compact’s text suggests that Con-
gress’s intent was neither unmistakably clear nor unambiguous in the 
text itself.100  
 If the Supreme Court would have conducted a more thorough 
analysis, it might have found that Congress did not consent to Okla-
homa’s protectionist laws.101 In such an instance, the Court could have 
also considered whether Oklahoma’s water permit laws have only an 
incidental effect on interstate commerce.102 If the effect of the state 
laws is only marginal, the Court could have upheld them on such 
grounds.103 Such an analysis and conclusion could have provided more 
guidance than the relatively light treatment of the important Com-
merce Clause issues in Tarrant.104  
                                                                                                                      
96 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61, 470 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 65) (noting multiple 
interpretations under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 indicated that 
“unmistakably clear” standard was unmet); Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1238. 
97 See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (discouraging the use of legislative 
history when searching for Congress’s intent to consent to abrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 
383, 410 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing that legislative history was insuffi-
cient to satisfy requirement of “explicit statutory authorization” from Congress); New Eng. 
Power, 455 U.S. at 342 (finding “isolated fragments of legislative history” insufficient to 
determine Congress’s intent); Tarrant III, 656 F.3d at 1238. 
98 See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230. 
99 See id. at 230–32. 
100 See id. at 230; Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (noting that the Supreme Court has applied an 
“unmistakably clear” standard for determining Congress’s intent in the context of the 
Eleventh Amendment, “but a similar approach is applied in other contexts”). 
101 See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959. 
102 See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970)). 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
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 The Commerce Clause exists to preserve national unity, but Okla-
homa’s water permit laws defy the purpose of the Constitution’s exclu-
sive grant to Congress.105 The Framers wanted to stop state protection-
ism from jeopardizing interstate cooperation, but these water laws will 
have the opposite effect.106 Protecting Oklahoma’s special interests in 
the short term will lead to larger problems in the long run because no 
state can divorce itself from the national enterprise.107 Allowing such 
protectionist laws could foster enmity between states over the growing 
problem of water scarcity in America and threatens to complicate ef-
forts to solve local water shortages that will worsen in coming years.108 
 Texas estimates that the population of the Dallas-Fort Worth met-
ropolitan area, the fourth largest in the nation, will swell to twice its size 
in about fifty years.109 Preventing Texas from purchasing unused Red 
River water from Oklahoma will weaken Texas’s ability to face an im-
pending water crisis through its increasing fresh water use for human 
consumption, livestock, sanitation, and irrigation.110 Global warming 
also is on a steady pace to intensify water scarcity by evaporating more 
of the Earth’s fresh water supply, including water available in Texas.111 
The convergence of these problems will challenge the federal govern-
ment as well as the states to adapt to new water use patterns with crea-
tive solutions,112 and preserving Oklahoma’s protectionist water laws 
                                                                                                                      
105 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979). One of the “central con-
cern[s] of the Framers” when drafting the Constitution was preventing the economic isola-
tionism that threatened the states under the Articles of Confederation. Id. For this reason, 
the Supreme Court interprets the Commerce Clause as imposing a restriction on state 
regulation of interstate commerce even in the absence of congressional action. Id. 
106 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005); The Federalist Nos. 6, 22 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
107 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (explaining that the Consti-
tution was founded on the theory that in the long run and prosperity will come through 
unity among the several states, not protectionism and isolationism). 
108 See Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12 Southeastern 
Envtl. L.J. 115, 115 (2004) (providing a compendium of different approaches to solving 
interstate water disputes). The increasing demand for fresh water calls for state planning 
that considers resources shared across state lines. Id. 
109 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tarrant III, supra note 22, at 3. 
110 Patranella, supra note 22, at 326–27; see Water Use in the United States, Nat’l Atlas, 
http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/water/a_wateruse.html (last modified Jan. 14, 2013) 
(illustrating that water use is diverse and includes a variety of common purposes). 
111 See Tarlock, supra note 2; Ramon Alvarez et al., Fair Warning–Global Warming and the 
Lone Star State, Envtl. Def., 5, 11–12, 14–17 (May 2006), http://www.edf.org/content/fair- 
warning-global-warming-and-lone-star-state. 
112 See Tarlock, supra note 2, at 1012–13. 
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might only complicate matters by obstructing interstate cooperation.113 
Taking the long view, as Justice Cardozo wrote decades ago in Baldwin v. 
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., the people of Oklahoma and Texas “must sink or 
swim together.”114 
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court’s holding in Tarrant Regional Water District v. 
Herrmann does not address whether the language of the Red River 
Compact, which apportions water between Texas and Oklahoma, meets 
the Court’s own standards for congressional consent to state protec-
tionism. The Court also did not address whether Oklahoma’s water 
permit laws have only a marginal effect on interstate commerce, which 
would provide a more solid ground for upholding them. Allowing pro-
tectionist water laws could have negative long-term consequences for 
Texas and could exacerbate water shortages in other parts of the nation 
by fostering economic isolationism. 
                                                                                                                      
113 See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 
336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949)) (noting that the Commerce Clause exists to prevent the states 
from refusing to cooperate with each other by treating themselves as “separable economic 
units”). 
114 See 294 U.S. at 523. 
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